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ABSTRACT
Search engines in online communities such as Twier or Facebook
not only return matching posts, but also provide links to the proles
of the authors. us, when a user appears in the top-k results for a
sensitive keyword query, she becomes widely exposed in a sensitive
context. e eects of such exposure can result in a serious privacy
violation, ranging from embarrassment all the way to becoming a
victim of organizational discrimination.
In this paper, we propose the rst model for quantifying search
exposure on the service provider side, casting it into a reverse k-
nearest-neighbor problem. Moreover, since a single user can be
exposed by a large number of queries, we also devise a learning-
to-rank method for identifying the most critical queries and thus
making the warnings user-friendly. We develop ecient algorithms,
and present experiments with a large number of user proles from
Twier that demonstrate the practical viability and eectiveness of
our framework.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Motivation. A query search engine in online communities, such
as Twier or Facebook, not only returns matching posts, but also
identies the users who have wrien the posts. is search exposure
risk is particularly pronounced when a user’s post appears in the
top-k results for a sensitive keyword query.
Note that exposure is dierent from just having contents visible
within a community. When Facebook introduced the News Feed
feature, a lot of users responded with outrage. ey felt their pri-
vacy was being violated, even though the new feature only meant
that newly generated content would be broadcasted to people who
would have access to that content anyway [5]. Analogously, in
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the context of search systems, while a user may be ne with post-
ing about health problems, controversial political issues or using
swearwords, she may feel very uncomfortable with the posts being
returned as top-ranked results. Content found this way could be
used, for example, in stories wrien by journalists or bloggers, and
aract uninvited aention to the user’s account. Beyond topically
sensitive queries, there are also risks regarding search exposure by
unique strings. An adversary could search for people posting urls of
sensitive domains, such as pirate websites, or certain price tokens,
such as $1K . An adversary with a list of e-mails could issue these
to nd answers to security questions necessary to reset passwords.
An adversary with a list of generated credit card numbers could
issue these as queries to nd other personal information necessary
for credit card transactions.
State of the Art and Limitations. Despite the existence of
such threats, to the best of our knowledge, there is no support
for users to nd out about their search exposure risks. e only
way would be to try out all possible queries and inspect their top-k
results, yet this is all but practical. e service providers – search
engines or social network platforms – do not provide such support
at all.
Work in the broad area of exposure has been tangibly motivated
by a study showing the discrepancy between the expected and
actual audience of user-generated content [2]. Exposure has been
addressed in other contexts so far, including information exposure
among friends in social networks [24], location exposure [29], longi-
tudinal information exposure [25], controlled information sharing
[27], or exposure with respect to sensitive topics [3]. e impor-
tance of exposure control has led service providers to introduce
features such as Facebook’s View As, which informs a user how her
prole appears to other people. However, this does not quantify
the exposure, and the problem of search exposure in particular has
been disregarded completely.
Problem and Challenges. To the best of our knowledge, this
paper is the rst to address the problem of modeling, analyzing and
quantifying search exposure risks. As the risk is most signicant
when a user is spoed in the top-k results of a query, our goal
is to identify these top-k exposing queries for each user. Such
information can then be used to guide the user, for example, in
deleting posts or restricting their visibility. In an online seing,
a tool based on our model could even alert the user about the
exposure before submiing a post.
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e search exposure problem poses a number of challenges:
• Eciency: A user could possibly be found by millions of distinct
queries. An algorithm to identify the critical queries thus faces
a huge scalability and eciency problem.
• Dynamics: With the high rate of new online contents, the critical
queries cannot simply be computed oine from a query log.
e exposure of users keeps continuously shiing.
• Usability: Showing all queries for which a user appears in the
top-k results would in many cases ood the user with millions
of irrelevant or small-risk queries and miss the point of guiding
the user. us, it is crucial that the queries are ranked by an
informative measure of, possibly user-specic, sensitivity.
An interesting thing to note is that from the perspective of a
user, reducing search exposure can be seen as a problem of “inverse
search engine optimization”, inverse SEO for short. SEO aims to
push a user to the top-ranked results for certain queries. Here,
the goal is the opposite – the users would like to be moved to the
low-ranked tail of answers, or even completely removed from the
search results of particularly sensitive queries.
Approach and Contributions. Keyword search with answer
ranking can be seen as the problem of nding the top-k nearest-
neighbor posts according to a given similarity function. us, we
can model search exposure as a reverse k-nearest-neighbor problem
(RkNN): for each post, we want to nd the queries for which the post
is among the top-k results. To identify these queries, we develop an
ecient algorithm that builds on threshold-based pruning [18, 33].
To assist a user in understanding her search exposure risks, we
devise an algorithm for ranking the queries in the user’s RkNN set,
which potentially contains hundreds of queries. To this end, we
combine informative features ranging from topical sensitivity (e.g.,
usually higher for queries about health problems than for those
about movies), through query selectivity and entropy (e.g., higher
for queries containing birth dates, or social security numbers),
to user surprisal (e.g., high for queries matching a post about a
user’s children in an otherwise professional prole). e salient
contributions of this paper are:
• A model of the search exposure problem;
• An ecient algorithm for computing the RkNN set of queries
for which a user appears in the top-k results;
• A learning to rank method with informative features for ranking
the queries in the exposure sets according to a new notion of
search exposure relevance;
• An experimental study with a large set of Twier proles, pro-
viding insights on the exposure sets and the eectiveness of our
query ranking methods.
2 PROBLEM STATEMENT
Preliminaries. Assume we have a set of users U and a set of doc-
uments D posted by the users. We denote the fact that a post d is
wrien by the user u by d ∈ u. e prole of each user is dened
as the set of all documents she has posted in a community.
Search exposure. e problem of search exposure of user u can
be formalized as nding all the reverse k-nearest neighbors of u,
i.e, the set of all the queries for which any of the posts of u comes
among the top-k results. We call the sets of such queries as exposure
sets.
Generation of exposure sets. Before computing the exposure
sets of all users, we rst compute RkNNs (d ) for each document d
as follows:
RkNNs (d ) = {(q,r ) |q ∈ Q ∧ d is the r th NN of q ∧ r ≤ k } (1)
where Q is the set of all queries and r is the rank of d for the
query q (r = rank (q,d )). According to Emrich et al., the above
equation is equivalent to the denition of a bichromatic RkNN [12].
Accordingly, we dene the exposure set of each user as the union
of the exposure sets of all the documents in his prole. We denote
the exposure set of the user u by RkNNs (u) which is dened as
follows:
RkNNs (u) = {(d,q,r ) |(q,r ) ∈ RkNNs (d ) ∧ d ∈ u} (2)
We discuss ecient generation of exposure sets in Sec. 3.
Ranking of queries in exposure sets. Exposure sets of certain
users might be big and dominated by rare, non-informative, or non-
critical queries. On the other hand, exposure by certain sensitive
queries might leave the user uncomfortable. erefore, to make
the exposure sets user-friendly, we want to rank the triples in
RkNNs (u) such that the queries the users would not want to be
searched by appear at the top. is denes the notion of relevance in
our ranking problem, termed search exposure relevance. We discuss
the exposure set ranking methods and our notion of relevance in
Sec. 4.
3 GENERATING EXPOSURE SETS
Ranking model. Generating the exposure set (set of RkNNs) re-
quires the knowledge of the ranking model. In this work, we assume
the documents are ranked using language models. More specically,
given a query q the relevance of the document d is measured by
the likelihood of model d generating q. Assuming no dependency
between terms, the logarithmic query likelihood is computed as
follows [11]:
ρ (q = t1t2...tn ,d ) =
n∑
i=1
log
fti ,d + µ
cti|C |
|d | + µ , (3)
where fti ,d is the frequency of the ith term of q in d , cti is the
frequency of the term ti in the whole corpus, |C | is the total number
of terms in the corpus and µ is the Dirichlet smoothing coecient.
eries. Any combination of words is a valid query. However,
considering all the possible queries makes our problem intractable.
erefore, we limit the set of queries to those that consist of at
most M words and have at least one exact match in our data set. In
other words, for each query q = t1,t2, ...tn , (1) n ≤ M and (2) there
should be at least one document in the dataset that contains all the
terms t1, t2, … tn .
Approach. Informing the users about the exposing queries can
be either retroactive or preventive. In the retroactive approach,
users are notied about their exposed documents posted so far.
Preventive warnings, however, make users aware of exposure risk
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at the time of uploading a document. Depending on the approach
chosen, a service provider may opt for static or dynamic generation
of RkNNs. In the former case, the exposure sets of users can be
computed statically and fetched upon the user’s request. However,
as the insertion, deletion or update of documents may aect the
exposure set of a user, the recomputation of the RkNNs would be
necessary every so oen. On the other hand, preventive warnings
require dynamic generation of the RkNNs for a document in an
ecient way.
e problem of BichromaticReversek NearestNeighbors (BRkNNs)
has been extensively studied so far. However, there is no generic e-
cient solution for this problem as the eciency is achieved through
applying various pruning techniques that are mainly dependent
on the distance function. For example, for the models with the Eu-
clidean distance or cosine similarity, many ltering methods have
been suggested based on dierent geometric properties [20, 26, 30].
However, for the models with textual queries only a few works
exist, which cannot be fully applied to our problem as either the
seing is monochromatic [21], the indexing tree of the queries
should be built which is not scalable to very high dimensions [39],
the storage of k nearest neighbors for all the queries is required
with a xed k [9], or only the conjunctive queries are considered
[1]. In the remainder of this section, we present our algorithm for
the dynamic generation of the RkNNs for the textual data.
In the considered ranking model, it can be shown that nding an
exposing query of length l (q = t1t2...tl ) for a particular documentd
where d is the nearest neighbor of q is NP-hard 1. Even if we bound
the maximum length of the queries (M) to two or three words, the
query search space is still large. erefore, we introduce the “RkNN
Growth” algorithm for more precise pruning of the query search
space.
RkNN Growth Algorithm (RGA). e underlying idea of this
algorithm is to use the information on the one-word RkNNs to nd
the two-word RkNNs. For simplicity, we assume that the maximum
length of the queries is two (M = 2), which resembles the 1.64
average query length on Twier [32]. In this algorithm, we rst
start with nding the unigram RkNNs for the given document d .
For this, we build an inverted index and sort the posting list Lti of
each term ti based on the relevance of the documents (posts) to ti .
Now, we can compare the score of the kth document in Lti with
ρ (q = ti ,d ) in constant time to decide whether the term ti is among
the RkNNs of the document d or not.
In order to nd the bigram RkNNs, we label the terms appearing
in the document d as follows:
• “T” which stands for Top, if the term appears among the
RkNNs of document d .
• “NT” which stands for Not Top, if the term is not an RkNN
of the document d .
We refer to the other terms as “NE” (Not Existing) as they do not
appear in the document d . Accordingly, there are ve possible
labelings for the two-word queries (T-T, T-NT, T-NE, NT-NT and
NT-NE). Note that due to the disjunctive nature of the queries,
labels T-NE and NT-NE are also allowed. It is straightforward to
show that the two following propositions hold in our model:
1By reduction from 3-SAT
Proposition 1. If rank (ti ,d ) = k ′ and rank (tj ,d ) = k ′′ and
k ′ + k ′′ < k , then the query q = ti tj is an RkNN of the document d .
Proof. Because of the monotonicity of our ranking model, for a
document d ′ to be more relevant to the query q = ti tj than d , either
ρ (ti ,d
′) > ρ (ti ,d ) or ρ (tj ,d ′) > ρ (tj ,d ) should hold. However,
these conditions hold for less than k documents in total as k ′+k ′′ <
k . 
Proposition 2. If the term ti in the document d has the label “NT”
and the term tj has label “NE”, then the query q = ti tj cannot be an
RkNN of the document d if there are at least k documents that are
both shorter and more relevant to the term ti than the document d .
Proof. As the relevance score is negatively proportional to the
length of the documents, and due to the Dirichlet smoothing, among
the documents without the term tj longer documents receive a
lower relevance score than the shorter ones. erefore, the above
statement can be interpreted as the document d being dominated by
more than k other documents in terms of the relevance to both the
terms ti and tj . As a result, d cannot have q = ti tj as an RkNN. 
We use the above statements to prune the query search space. For
the remaining queries, we adopt the Reverse reshold Algorithm
(RTA) introduced by Vlachou et al. [33]. In this algorithm, the goal
is to avoid unnecessary computations of the kNNs of the queries
using a buer. Details can be found in [33].
Algorithm 1 illustrates the steps of RGA. For each token ti in
the input document d , rst the set of all the candidate queries (C)
containing ti is extracted (Line 2). As all of the candidate queries
contain the term ti , we initiate the buer for the reverse threshold
algorithm (RTA) with the k nearest neighbors of ti by running
threshold algorithm on the inverted index I (Line 3). We perform
the rst step of pruning (if possible) in Line 5 by removing all the
possible extensions of type “NT-NE”. Next, we test the applicability
of Proposition 1 for pruning C (Line 7). e remaining queries are
passed to the function RTA where the queries are either ltered
or added to the exposure set of d (Line 8). Finally, the exposure
set of the document d is reported. Although the worst case time
(and space) complexity of RGA is the same as that of the RTA, our
experiments show a signicant speed improvement in practice.
Algorithm 1: RkNN Growth Algorithm
Input : Document d , k , set of queries Q , inverted index I , set of
documents D
Output :RkNNs (d )
1 foreach token ti ∈ d do
2 Compute the candidate set of queries C
3 Compute the k nearest neighbors of q = ti using I and store
them in buf f er
4 if ti has label “NT” and Proposition 2 holds then
5 Remove all the queries q = ti tj of type “NT-NE” from C
6 end
7 Prune C by Proposition 1 (if possible)
8 Run RTA(d , D , C , k , buf f er )
9 end
10 Report RkNNs of d
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4 RANKING OF QUERIES IN EXPOSURE SETS
Generating the exposure sets is not enough for the results to be
presentable to end users for two reasons. First of all, for many users
the size of their RkNN set is simply too big for easy consumption.
Our experiments on a sample of 50K user proles from Twier
later conrm this – even when only unigram and bigram queries
are considered, more than 35K users are exposed by more than 100
queries, with some users exposed by millions. Figure 1 shows the
distribution of exposure set size for users from the sample.
Moreover, since we do not a priori exclude queries such as infre-
quent or numerical tokens most RkNN sets will end up dominated
by garbage queries. Leaving such queries in during the generation
phase is a design choice motivated by the ’worst case scenario’
principle that oen guides privacy and security research. While
most users will nd these queries uninformative, for some people
it might be important to know they are searchable by certain URLs
(e.g., when the domain is known to contain sensitive content) or
numbers (e.g., their year of birth or the prices of products they
buy). Table 1 shows examples of the top queries in the raw expo-
sure sets where queries are ordered by the rank position of the
corresponding user post. ese examples illustrate the need for
ranking the queries before presentation to end users – raw sets are
uninformative when mostly garbage queries are shown to the users
rst.
4.1 Learning to rank the exposing queries
Recall the search exposure sets dened by Eq. 2. We want to rank
the triples within these sets according to search exposure relevance,
i.e., such that the queries the users would not want to be searched
by appear at the top. e traditional IR learning to rank setup, in
which the learned function orders the documents by relevance to
queries, is replaced by one where we rank the queries according to
relevance to users.
Each user-document-query triple can be represented as a fea-
ture vector Φ(u,d,q). For each user, together with the relevance
score annotations, these form partial rankings determining pair-
wise relevance constraints between the data points (e.g., for a user
u, an exposing query q1 matching a document d1 should be ranked
higher than the query q2 matching a document d2.) We want to
learn a ranking function that minimizes a loss measure over these
partial training rankings. For example, when learning to rank using
SVMrank [19], it is the number of violated pairwise constraints that
is minimized, which implicitly leads to maximization of Kendall’s
τ between the golden and learned rankings.
We describe the features and relevance scores we used to learn
the ranking function in the following two sections.
4.2 Features
4.2.1 Semantic features. e meaning of words plays an impor-
tant role in determining criticality of search exposure. In a similar
context, user studies have shown topical sensitivity to be useful
in the context of privacy risk quantication from text [3]. To cap-
ture the coarse-grained semantics of the queries, we annotate them
with categories from the LIWC dictionaries [31]. LIWC categorizes
words into 80 linguistically and psychologically meaningful cate-
gories such as positive emotion (love, nice, sweet), aective processes
(happy, cry, abandon), swear words (damn, piss, fuck), anxiety (wor-
ried, fearful, nervous), or sexual (horny, love, incest). We create one
binary feature based on each category, with a value of 1 if any of
the query words matches any of the words from the category.
4.2.2 Uniqueness of queries. While any query generated from
a community’s text contents search-exposes some of its members,
from the perspective of a single user, these are the rare tokens
that are more likely to lead to exposure. While a considerable
portion of rare queries are simply meaningless noise, it is possible
that there are meaningful infrequent tokens with the potential to
violate privacy. Recall some of our motivating examples where an
adversary searches for information associated with a given sensitive
domain, or an e-mail address.
We propose two features to capture how rare a query is: query
selectivity and query entropy. We dene the query selectivity as
the number of documents matching the query exactly:
selectivity (q) = |{d : q ∈ d }| (4)
is measure will be low for queries which appear infrequently.
Another aspect of a query being unique is how skewed the
distribution of the relevance scores is. We capture this by measuring
the entropy over the distribution of ranking scores of the top-k
returned results. Let R be the distribution of the relevance scores
of the top-k results. We measure the entropy of the query as:
entropy (q) = H (R), where R (i ) = score (q,di )∑k
j score (q,dj )
(5)
Note that these measures are not dependent on a given user, but
are dependent on the community as a whole, i.e., the relative rank-
ings of queries in dierent communities might dier. For instance,
while the query Lyme borreliosis might be an infrequent query on
Twier, it could be more popular in a medical Q&A forum.
4.2.3 User surprisal. e lexical context of a user might also
maer when determining the criticality of a query. Imagine a user
with a Twier prole where she posts mostly professional content.
It would not be surprising, and perhaps even desirable, that the
user’s posts are returned as top results to the queries from that
professional domain. However, if it turns out that the user prole
comes up at the top only to the query funny cats that matches
that single post the user has ever made outside of the professional
domain, this might be both unexpected and undesirable.
We propose to capture this intuition using surprisal, which is
measured by reversing the probability of the query being generated
from a user’s vocabulary distribution estimated from the posts:
surprisal (q,u) = loд
(
1
P (q |u)
)
= loд
(
1∏
w ∈q P (w |u)
)
(6)
To account for the sparsity of user proles, we compute these
probabilities using Dirichlet smoothing.
4.2.4 Document surprisal. Even though these are the queries
that are ranked, the users might not want to be matched to a non-
critical query when it exposes a critical post. Similarly to surprisal
of queries, we dene the surprisal of posts that are matched by the
exposing queries by replacing q by d in Eq. 6.
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Table 1: Example queries from unprocessed exposure sets.
aim oshtitsbaj, asleep oshtitsbaj, hp://ra*.com/teh ba splash, mac vanilla, suck wake, mood sick
emma sun, watch xxxxxx, forget toast, @je* fall, heavyweight ladder, omg tan, alcohol nice
blown death, comin lake, parilla wait, bathroom wanna, crush hannah, friend lord, record woman
4.2.5 RkNN features. Two traditional methods for ranking the
reverse nearest neighbors by relevance to the user are the proximity
of the reverse neighbor to the user and the rank of the reverse
neighbor. While not likely to be useful when the relevance is
dened as criticality, we include these features for comparison. We
measure proximity using the probability of generating the query
from the posting history of u:
proximity (q,u) = loд (P (q |u)) (7)
Let du be the post of a user u that is returned as an answer to query
q at position rank (q,du ):
rankposition(q,u) = rank (q,du ) (8)
4.2.6 Syntactic features. We also introduce a number of binary
post-dependent features that characterize emotional display or
content the users might not want to be exposed by through search.
ese include:
• has url (set to 1 if the post contains a URL),
• has at mention (set to 1 if the post mentions another user),
• has hashtag (set to 1 of the query contains a hashtag).
• has emoticon (set to 1 if the post contains an emoticon),
• has repeated punctuation (set to 1 is any token in the post ends
with a double exclamation mark, double question mark, or an
ellipsis),
• has repeated vowels (set to 1 if any token in a post contains a
vowel repeated at least three times in a row),
• has laughter (set to 1 if any token contains a substring like haha,
with dierent vowels).
4.3 Relevance
Search exposure relevance diers in many ways from the topical
relevance of traditional IR tasks. A query might be relevant not only
because it’s topically sensitive, but also because it could embarrass,
oend, or otherwise violate the privacy of the exposed person. e
subjective nature of such judgments makes the manual collection
of relevance at scale an extremely time-consuming task, especially
if done by external evaluators. To decide which queries would be
relevant, a judge would have to put themselves in the shoes of the
evaluated user, imagine who that person is based on the contents of
the prole, and decide which queries would concern her. Moreover,
a judge would have to come up with likely threat scenarios. It
is a non-trivial task to prime the judges regarding these issues
without biasing them. With all these considerations, we derive
implicit relevance scores from other user-generated signals that
indicate reluctance to be associated with a given content. Implicit
relevance signals, especially in the form of clickthrough paerns,
are commonly used in traditional retrieval tasks [7]. e remainder
of this section presents our method for synthesizing the search
exposure relevance scores.
User score. If a user deletes a post, it is a signal she does not want
to be associated with its content. us, a query matching a post that
got deleted aer publication receives a user score of 1, whereas a
query matching a non-deleted post receives a user score of 0. While
a service provider quantifying exposure would have a direct access
to this information, there are also ways for collecting it outside of
the system [25]. We describe our collection method in more detail
in the experimental section.
Community score. e deletion information is a noisy signal,
however, as users delete posts for a variety of reasons, including
language or double posting errors. We want to sanitize these scores
using stronger, community-wide signals that encode the dierences
in language distributions in anonymous and non-anonymous com-
munities. ese linguistic dierences have been observed, for in-
stance, when comparing posts from Twier and Whisper (an anony-
mous microposting platform) [10]. Having estimated the vocabu-
lary distributions in an anonymous (Panon ) and a non-anonymous
(Pnon−anon ) community, we treat the relative probability of a query
being generated from these distributions as a community-wide sig-
nal that users do not want to be associated with the keywords.
More precisely, we set the community score of a query to:
community score (q) =
Panon (q)
Pnon−anon (q)
=
∏
w ∈q
Panon (w )
Pnon−anon (w )
Golden ranking. Finally, we derive the relevance as a linear com-
bination of both scores:
score (q) = α · user score (q) + (1 − α ) · community score (q)
Combining both scores allows us to discount the relevance of noisy
queries that match deleted posts, as well as add relevance to sen-
sitive queries matching posts that did not get deleted, as the user
perhaps did not have any privacy concerns in mind.
5 EXPERIMENTS: RKNN GENERATION
5.1 Dataset
For our experiments, we use a sample of Twier proles from the
longitudinal exposure study by Mondal et al. [25]. It consists of
51,550 user proles with a total of about 5.5 million tweets posted
over the year 2009.
5.2 RkNN Generation
5.2.1 Data preparation. Before generating the RkNNs, we per-
formed data cleaning, including stop word removal, lemmatization
and stemming. As a result, we extracted around 2 million unique
tokens. For the query generation, we considered all the unigrams
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ery Type Average number of
candidate queries
eries present
in the exposure
set (%)
T-T 0.5 100
T-NT 4.6 99
NT-NT 15.5 73
T-NE 348.6 90
NT-NE 125112.1 0.4
Table 2: Statistics on query types.
and bigrams appearing in at least one tweet, which means around
45 million queries in total.
5.2.2 Static generation. In order to report the exposure sets of
all users, we found the k nearest neighbors of each query using
the threshold algorithm with 16 parallel processes, and added the
query to the exposure sets of the resulting tweets’ authors. Using a
cluster node with 1.5 TB memory and 48 CPU cores, it took about
10 hours in total to generate the exposure sets of all users.
5.2.3 Dynamic generation. In Section 3, we introduced ve
types of bigram queries. Table 2 shows the average number of
dierent types of candidate queries per tweet. For example, among
all the candidates for exposure sets, around 349 queries are of type
“T-NE”. e last column of Table 2 shows the average percentage of
each type appearing in the exposure sets. e values in the last row
conrm the importance of pruning based on Proposition 2 in RkNN
Growth Algorithm, as only 0.4 percent of the candidate “NT-NE”
queries end up in the exposure sets. For example, neither the query
“garden” nor any of its extensions (21,112 queries) were RKNN of
the tweet “planting the garden today”.
We experimented the dynamic generation of the exposure set
with RGA on a random sample of 1000 tweets. Our experiments
showed the eectiveness of our pruning technique as the extension
of around 87% of queries with label “NT” to the type “NT-NE” was
prevented. More precisely, if the document d is not among the
top k results of the query q = ti , then with probability of at least
0.87 the document d would not be among the top k results of any
query q = ti tj with the type “NT-NE”. e RGA pruned 99% (96%
through Proposition 2 and 3% through RTA) of all the candidate
queries of type “NT-NE” per document on average. As a result, we
observed a signicant amount of speed improvement in generating
the exposure set of a tweet (2.24 seconds on average) compared to
the baseline RTA (around 8.6 minutes on average).
5.3 Exposure Sets Analysis
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the size of exposure sets of the
users in the dataset for dierent values of k . Notably, there are
a few users whose exposure set is huge (in the order of millions)
– they are referred to as hubs. On the other hand, there are 3196
users (6% of all users) with an empty exposure set. ese users are
referred to as anti-hubs, as their prole does not show up as a result
for any query.
Table 3 shows example tweets of hubs and anti-hubs in our
dataset. Examining the user with the largest exposure set, we
noticed she did not have anything personal in her prole but only
Figure 1: Distribution of the size of exposure sets. e values
on Y axis are in logarithmic scale with base 10.
posted titles of the songs broadcast on the radio. However, the
prole of the 7th hub is mainly personal, containing tweets like the
one in the second row of the table. e last row of Table 3 shows
that a tweet may contain sensitive words (’hate animals’), but still
not appear among the top-k results of any query.
6 EXPERIMENTS: EXPOSURE SET RANKING
In this section, we discuss our insights into the search exposure
problem through evaluation of the ranking methods, as well as an
analysis of user perceptions regarding exposing queries collected
in an experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk.
6.1 ery ranking in exposure sets
6.1.1 Exposure sets cleaning. For the evaluation results to be
meaningful, we excluded the following queries from the exposure
sets: queries with tokens shorter than 3 leers, queries for which
none of the tokens is an English word, queries with numerical
tokens, urls, and references to other accounts. We also excluded
users whose posts are primarily wrien in a language other than
English. While all of these queries could be search exposure relevant
in certain contexts, it is unlikely that human judges who evaluate
the ranking outputs would be able to associate any meaning with
them.
6.1.2 Relevance score statistics. We construct the relevance scores
as described in Sec. 4.3. Community scores are derived from the
Whisper dataset collected by Correa et al. [10], and the Twier
dataset collected by Mondal et al. [25]. e Twier dataset, more-
over, comes with the information regarding tweet deletion. More
precisely, by querying the Twier API using a subset of the tweet
IDs, the authors were able to determine which tweets got deleted
aer publication. is information was collected for 11M tweets,
400K of which turned out to have been removed. We use these
signals as the user score.
Because the information about post deletion is limited, the ground
truth provides us with only a partial ranking over RkNN queries.
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User type User ID Tweet example Example of query to nd the tweet Size of exposure set
Hub 19519947 Now on 50s on 5: In Dreams by Roy Orbison Roy Orbison 3,993,702
Hub 20463153 I hate being claustrophobic, esp when I have
to go into a tight space or in a cave
claustrophobic 2,809,290
Anti-hub 29664249 studying No query 0
Anti-hub 2847248 i hate animals No query 0
Table 3: Examples of hubs and anti-hubs.
Table 4: Most important semantic features learned by the
L2R model together with example queries.
Feature Example queries
Sexual gross kiss, breast whitney, gay shirt
Humans dumbest guy, girl xoxo, chess kid
Friend pal wife, fellow fool, ummm honey
Anger buy weapon, mad scientist, idiot vegetarian
We therefore exclude the queries for which we cannot infer rele-
vance from the evaluation in this part. ese include: (i) the queries
matching posts for which we do not have the deletion information,
(ii) the queries with only a partial overlap with the source post
(it might happen that a post is returned in the top-k results for
a query even though not all query words appear in the post; for
such queries we do not assume the deletion information signals
not wanting to be associated with the words). Excluding exposure
sets with less than 30 queries, which do not need ranking to be
presentable to users, we are le with around 15K proles under
evaluation.
6.1.3 Ranking algorithm. To learn the ranking function, we use
SVMrank [19] with the linear kernel. Parameter C is tuned on a
random sample of 10% RkNN sets, and the rest of the data is used
to evaluate the L2R method in a 10-fold cross-validation.
6.1.4 Feature analysis. e weights of the decision boundary
vector learned using SVM with a linear kernel can be interpreted
as feature importance weights. Table 4 lists the most important
features learned by our model together with example queries ex-
hibiting the features. e model captures well that the categories
related to personal issues are the ones people feel more uncomfort-
able sharing. High importance of words related to sexuality stems
from the bias of the Whisper data – a large majority of anonymous
posts from this community regard sexuality. However, the method-
ology we propose is general enough to handle dierent types of
anonymous contents. For instance, as an alternative, it would be
possible to collect anonymous posts from more general estion
& Answer communities such as ora.
6.2 User-study evaluation
Because the relevance scores used for training the algorithm con-
stitute noisy signals for search exposure relevance, we evaluate
the reranked exposure sets in a user study. e leading question
is whether users themselves would nd the output useful, feel-
ing that exposure by top-ranked keywords would make them feel
uncomfortable. is section provides the details of the study.
6.2.1 Evaluation setup. To evaluate the rankings, we sample a
number of exposure sets and a number of queries from each.
User sampling: e rst important thing to note is that not all of
the exposure sets contain sensitive queries. To account for this and
make sure we cover the sensitive users in the evaluation, we sample
users non-uniformly in the following way. eries within exposure
sets are ordered by the predicted relevance scores. e score of
the highest ranking query within a set can be thought of as an
indicator of how sensitive the exposure set is overall (i.e., the lower
the highest score, the less sensitive content there is overall). For
evaluation, we choose the 50 most sensitive exposure sets, and 50
exposure sets sampled from the remaining tail with the probability
proportional to the predicted relevance of the highest scoring query.
We thus evaluate 100 exposure sets in total.
ery sampling: To construct assignments with reasonable work-
loads, we evaluate 50 queries from each of the sampled exposure
sets. Having the queries ranked by the L2R method under evalua-
tion, we choose 25 highest scoring queries (to see how useful the
top of the ranking is), and 25 queries chosen uniformly randomly
from the remaining tail (to control if the head of the ranking does
not miss critical queries).
6.2.2 AMT survey. Each set of 50 sampled queries was shown
to 3 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers. e queries were displayed
in a random order. We required that the workers have a master
qualication (to ensure the quality of annotations) and are located in
the USA (to prevent language misunderstanding). Upon explaining
the basic pipeline of the Twier search engine and priming the users
about what exposure is, the survey asked the following question:
Would you feel concerned (uncomfortable, embar-
rassed, privacy-violated, or threatened) if your tweet
was returned as one of the top answers to these
search terms? (Yes/No)
Having three people evaluate each query leads to a 4-graded (0..3)
relevance scale, based on how many people chose Yes.
Out of 5K evaluated queries, 10% had a score of 3, 12% had a
score of 2, 24% had a score of 1, 54% had a score of 0. Inter-annotator
agreement measured by Fleiss’ κ was 0.376, which corresponds to
a fair agreement.
6.2.3 Results. We report the values for NDCG@[5,10,20] and
Kendall’s τ . Moreover, since the collected scores oer good in-
terpretability in terms of binary relevance as well, we also report
Precision@[5,10,20], assuming a query is search exposure relevant
if it was marked by at least one judge.
Table 5 shows the results of the user-study evaluation. Note that,
although the queries were sampled from the L2R-ranked exposure
sets, the collected judgments also let us evaluate other ranking
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heuristics. We use the rankings based on the values of several high-
level features as baselines. Majority of these perform signicantly
worse than the L2R method – dierences signicant by a paired
t-test with p < 0.05 are marked with the ∗ symbol. e strongest
heuristics include document surprisal and selectivity. Both of these
quantities capture a dierent aspect of the rareness of the content,
and thus shine in situations where, for instance, the judges thought
that exposure by a typo might lead to embarrassment. We also
observed that a number of query tokens are typos that can be
mapped to a sensitive word. Such queries were oen marked by the
judges as relevant, and because of their rareness, heuristics such as
selectivity gain in performance.
6.2.4 Anecdotal examples of sensitive exposure sets. Table 6 presents
examples of exposure sets with the top-10 queries ranked by the
L2R method and is meant as an overview of the types of sensitive
keywords a user might be exposed by in Twier. eries were
generated from the contents of user posts, which means that each
presented word combination matches at least one post in our sam-
ple. We resort to showing a manually chosen subset of examples, as
the top sensitive exposure sets were highly explicit and oensive.
7 INSIGHTS INTO SEARCH EXPOSURE
RELEVANCE
7.1 Tweet context
An interesting question regarding search exposure relevance is
whether it is inuenced by the context of the returned tweet. It
might happen that a query that looks sensitive is constructed from
words that do not form a coherent context within a post, thus being
a false alarm. On the other hand, innocent looking queries might
bring out posts that do contain sensitive content otherwise.
To gain preliminary insight into this problem, we conducted a
second survey on AMT, in which the workers assessed the relevance
of queries, also knowing the tweet that is being returned as a result;
the rest of the setup remained analogous. Comparison of these two
surveys is summarized in Figure 2. Existence of dark squares outside
of the diagonal suggests indeed that the context might change the
exposure relevance judgement. is happens both ways, suggesting
that both scenarios we mentioned in the previous paragraph are
plausible. We believe that investigating the factors that inuence
the search exposure relevance is an interesting topic for future
work.
7.2 Search exposure relevance vs topical
sensitivity
Topical sensitivity is a concept introduced for studying privacy
risks of text, in particular for quantifying R-Susceptibility (Rank-
Susceptibility) in communities where user proles consist of textual
contents [3]. It measures how likely the presence of words from
dierent topics (understood as distributions over words) leads to
privacy risks, irrespective of the user or community context. We
want to understand if there is a correlation between topical sensi-
tivity dened this way and the search exposure relevance. We thus
annotate each query from our evaluation set using the topical sen-
sitivity annotations sensitivity (t ) collected in the R-Susceptibility
Figure 2: Inuence of the tweet context on search exposure
relevance. e number in a square x (q), y (q + t ) denotes
the number of tweets that received the score of x in the
study with queries only, and the score of y in the study with
queries in context.
paper [3]. We dene the sensitivity of a query as:
sensitivity (q) =
1
|q |
∑
w ∈q
∑
t
sensitivity (t ) · P (w |t ) (9)
where P (w |t ) is the probability of a word w in the topic t .
We measure the correlation between these sensitivity-annotations
and the collected relevance scores using the Pearson correlation
coecient. We nd a strong correlation between these scores in
case of the relevance collected for queries without the tweet context
(Pearson coecient of 0.44), and a lile lower correlation (Pearson
coecient of 0.32) in case of the relevance judgments for queries
with the tweet context. is result reconrms the ndings from
the evaluation of the L2R method – the meaning of the query is an
important factor in determining search exposure relevance, and top-
ical sensitivity is a viable alternative for implicit relevance scores.
8 RELATEDWORK
Exposure. Although, to the best of our knowledge, the problem
of search exposure has not been addressed in the past, there are
dierent aspects of user and data exposure that have been studied
in the prior literature. Mondal et al. proposed exposure control as
an alternative solution to access control in social networks [24], and
later devised solutions for longitudinal exposure control [25]. Biega
et al. quantify privacy risks for sensitive topics in rankings based
on textual posts using the notion of R-Susceptibility [3]. Exposure
has also been studied in the context of individual aribute leakege,
such as location [29]. Another interesting problem is that of usabil-
ity of exposure warnings. Example solutions include depicting the
current size of content audience by the size of a displayed pair of
eyes [27].
Privacy-preserving IR. Problems studied in privacy-preserving
IR include sanitization of query logs prior to a release [15, 38],
or obfuscation of query histories through broadened or dummy
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Table 5: Exposure set ranking user-study results averaged over all users. Methods marked with ∗ perform signicantly worse
than L2R on a given metric (paired t-test, p < 0.05).
Prec@5 Prec@10 Prec@20 NDCG@5 NDCG@10 NDCG@20 Kendall’s τ
L2R 0.636 0.566 0.509 0.515 0.496 0.530 0.107
Surprisal 0.448∗ 0.449∗ 0.447∗ 0.210∗ 0.245∗ 0.316∗ -0.035∗
Document Surprisal 0.480∗ 0.471∗ 0.470∗ 0.229∗ 0.262∗ 0.350∗ 0.016∗
Entropy 0.472∗ 0.489∗ 0.494 0.209∗ 0.262∗ 0.347∗ 0.026∗
Selectivity 0.548∗ 0.508∗ 0.489 0.278∗ 0.305∗ 0.378∗ 0.037∗
Rank 0.460∗ 0.463∗ 0.466∗ 0.204∗ 0.248∗ 0.330∗ 0.018∗
Table 6: Top-10 sensitive exposing queries returned by the L2R model for a subset of users.
blame gay, dutch gay, gay rabo, gay guy, blame dutch,
suck teacher, start tht, rider tour, donald duck, aack bad
gay racist, fuckin young, deal gay, simon watchin, fuckin kinda,
guy note, kind sum, live net, bcoz gay, dnt season
adopt convert, adopt religion, convert religion, convert essay, essay religion,
bon convert, bon religion, bon essay, river tonight, adult love
lesbian pregnant, lesbian music, lesbian live, boat lesbian, gay norway,
end lesbian, fri gay, bell page, star trend, lesbian uuum
oooh virgin, virgin wen, video virgin, crack oooh, oooh wen,
normal tom, normal smith, smith tom, swine year, outt xoxo
gay israel, bit web, gay gunman, michael pant, hat pant,
aack bit, e-mail match, israel wtf, china tale, obama recov
david queer, queer ted, asian queer, queer warhol, david folk,
model race, keith york, driver rule, kind remix, jean odd
camera stick, stick tape, rep usa, china rep, stick tehran,
governor tehran, governor stick, prayer tehran, prayer tehran, israel rep
detail obama, alex detail, alex obama, box long, bloomberg ash,
dubai investor, dubai investor, june real, june real, alybi*@gmail.com investor
u.s. union, mexico union, canada union, american union, demand democrat,
agenda reform, nasa obama, american borderless, nazi obama, demand overhaul
queries [14, 34]. A number of works also investigate the viability
of personalized search under privacy constraints [8, 28, 35, 40].
User protection and internal audits. Service providers increas-
ingly come under close scrutiny by external organizations and
observers, including journalists and researchers. is pressure en-
courages the SPs to perform proactive, internal audits to improve
their services and infrastructure. New solutions for increased pri-
vacy are constantly introduced to mitigate the threats for users
from external adversaries in services like maps [17]. User data
itself has also been analyzed, for example, to deliver beer security
protections in the context of account recovery personal questions
[4]. Beyond privacy, there are also other societal issues that press
SPs to audit their services, including the issues of fairness and bias
[13], or user satisfaction with search results [23].
Search exposure can be seen as another dimension for internal
audits. Along these lines, we believe more work can be done to ex-
amine which types of search queries should be blocked altogether,
and which search results should be removed to protect against nd-
ing users in sensitive contexts. While certain ad-hoc protections are
already in place (for instance, it seems impossible to explicitly query
for credit card numbers in Google, Twier, or Facebook, since these
tokens get post-processed and end up matching other numerical
tokens as well), there is a need for a more direct examination and
protection mechanisms regarding the exposure of users in search
systems.
(Reverse) k-nearest-neighbors problems. Finding the set of re-
verse k nearest neighbors (a.k.a. the inuence set) of a point has
been studied in various contexts such as matching the user pref-
erences to a given product [33] or the assignment of a publication
to a set of subscriptions [1, 9]. e seing of such problems falls
into either of these categories: monochromatic or bichromatic. is
classication is based on whether the points and their reverse near-
est neighbors come from an identical set (monochromatic) or not
(bichromatic) [12]. Our model is an instance of a bichromatic RkNN
based on the fact that the set of queries and the set of the documents
are disjoint.
Many algorithms have been introduced for ecient generation of
the sets of RkNNs, diering mainly in their approach to pruning the
search space. Some of these pruning methods are the grid-based
reverse threshold algorithm [33] and its improved version [22],
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branch and bound on hierarchical grid structure [36] and branch
and bound on indexing trees whose nodes have either the shape of a
circle or a cone [26] or a rectangle (minimum bounding rectangles)
[39]. e existing algorithms, however, are not suciently ecient
for our problem due to high dimensionality, large cardinality and
sparsity of the query vector space.
With an increase in the size of the (R)kNN problem, distributed
and parallel computation usually becomes inevitable to guarantee
scalability. Eective data partitioning [16, 37], load balancing [1]
and minimizing the communication cost of the machines [6] have
been studied for the (R)kNN problem so far. In this work, however,
we leave a distributed version of the proposed algorithm as a future
work.
9 CONCLUSION
is paper introduces the problem of quantifying user search expo-
sure, that is, nding the queries for which any of the user’s posts
is returned as a top-ranked result in a given search system. We
proposed an ecient RkNN Growth Algorithm for computing the
exposing queries, as well as methods for ranking the queries in
the resulting exposure sets to make the output user-friendly. To
solve this ranking task, we moreover dened the concept of search
exposure relevance, and studied it in a series of AMT surveys.
We believe there are a number of fascinating research questions
that could be studied as an extension to the work presented in
this paper. On the generation side, considering other ranking mod-
els, expanding the query length and ecient stream processing of
search exposure requests, including parallel computation, caching
and request partitioning would be necessary in a real-world deploy-
ment. On the usability and ranking side, further understanding of
exposure relevance, designing beer ranking methods, studying
the exposure under dierent search models, incorporating the prob-
abilities of queries being asked to the overall setup, or detecting
exposure in black-box systems, are only a few of such extension
possibilities. Finally, further investigating layman perceptions re-
garding search exposure, as well as developing the expert under-
standing of the possible threats, would give us a beer grip of this
newly dened privacy question.
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